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International Law of Self-Determination
and the Ogoni Question: -Mirroring
Africa's Post-Colonial Dilemma*
CHINEDU REGINALD EZETAH**
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 10,1995, the Nigerian military government, led
by General Sanni Abacha, executed internationally acclaimed en-
vironmentalist and human rights activist Ken Saro Wiwa and eight
other Ogoni citizens. The government performed the executions
because criminal charges were purportedly proved against these
Ogoni people. The real issue, underlying the summary executions,
or brutal murders, however, was the Ogoni struggle for self-
determination in the face of environmental devastation and egre-
gious human rights violations. By demonstrating the inherently
revolutionary character of the basic right of self-determination
and by underlining its susceptibility to political, economic, social,
and environmental considerations, the Ogoni experience indicts
the narrow restrictions on the contemporary doctrine of self-
determination.
The international law concept of self-determination is on trial
in Nigeria, but not for the first time. The Ogoni struggle is analo-
gous to Biafra's unsuccessful secession bid from Nigeria in 1967.
The Ogoni share the Biafrans' liberation grounds-political domi-
* An earlier draft of this Article was presented to the 1996 Annual Meeting of the
Canadian Association of African Studies at McGill University, Montreal, Qudbec, Can-
ada on May 3, 1996.
** Member, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos. I am grateful to Pro-
fessor Maurice Copithorne, UNHRC Special Representative in Iran, and my good friends
Virtus Igwokwe and Amir Attaran for their support and encouragement. I also thank
Professors Douglas Sanders and Karen Mickelson for useful comments on initial drafts of
this Article. I dedicate this Article to the memory of Kenule Saro Wiwa 'who lived and
died for a noble cause.
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nation, economic exploitation, and egregious human rights viola-
tions. Such ethnic conflict, however, is not peculiar to Nigeria. It
is the primary cause of state disintegration in Africa as a whole.
1
In 1967, international law did not support' the Biafran strug-
gle.2 Does it support the cause of the Ogoni today? How practical
is secession or autonomy for the Ogoni when they exist among 250
Nigerian ethnic groups that harbor loyalty to the Nigerian state?
If the link between self-determination and the colonial Uti-
Possidetis principle 3 is unbreakable, perhaps international law
should expand self-determination rights to include loose federa-
tion rights based on ethno-cultural autonomy.
This Article aims to stimulate intellectual debate on the defi-
ciency of self-determination law in small helpless territories like
Ogoniland and, more generally, in post-colonial Africa. This Ar-
ticle analyzes the Ogoni experience as a prelude to a discussion of
the law of self-determination and its inadequacy in the African
context. Part II tells the Ogoni story. It discusses the basis for the
Ogoni as a "people," the impact of the devastation of the Ogoni
environment on the Ogoni, and the Ogoni struggle for political
and economic independence. In particular, it examines the Nige-
rian Government's violent repression of the Ogoni, and the re-
sponse of the international community to such action. Part II
concludes with a preliminary comment on the legitimacy of the
Ogoni claims. Part III reviews the law of self-determination as es-
1. See Ali Mazrul, The African State as a Political Refugee: Institutional Collapse
and Human Displacement, INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 27 (1995). The patch-up work cur-
rently taking place in Rwanda means nothing if the autonomy of both the Tutsis and Hu-
tus is not guaranteed. South Africa also faces this problem with its share of Zulu national-
ism. Similarly affected are Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, Zaire, Angola, Mauritania, Mali,
Chad, Senegal, Liberia (currently in civil war), Sudan, and Somalia. Rwanda's genocide
perhaps foreshadows future possibilities. See D. Binder & B. Crossette, Ethnic Conflicts:
Hot Spots, GLOBE AND MAIL, Feb. 20, 1993, at D5.
2. See Secretary General's Press Conference, U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Mar. 1970, at
36.
3. The Uti-Possidetis principle was conceived in Latin America and prescribes the
preservation of the territory demarcations under colonial regimes corresponding to each
of the colonial entities that constituted a state. Africa adopted the principle through the
O.A.U. Resolution on Border Disputes, July 21, 1964, reprinted in 21 International Or-
ganisation 102-27 (1967). The International Court of Justice applied and upheld the
principle in the Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso-Republic of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554,
565-67 and the Guinea-Guinea (Bissau) Maritime Delimitation Case, 1985 I.L.R. 77, 636,
657.
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poused by both legal principles and state practice. Part IV ad-
dresses the Ogoni right to self-determination, highlighting the in-
adequacy of the law of self-determination in Africa. Finally, Part
V analyzes the African dilemma and concludes that a solution lies
in an expansion of the law of internal self-determination to in-
clude a right to confederal autonomy for African states.
II. THE OGONI STORY
A. Background
In 1914, Nigeria, the largest African state, emerged from the
British amalgamation of 250 diverse ethnic groups.4 Since its in-
dependence in 1960, Nigeria's political leadership has remained a
troublesome issue echoing the country's contrived nature and pov-
erty of national consciousness. 5 Amidst a paradox of astounding
wealth, Nigeria, with its enormous natural endowments, has con-
tinually faced economic poverty. Worst hit in this debacle are
those communities from which the wealth is being bled. Ogo-
niland is one such community. Closely linked to the exploitation
and neglect of the Ogoni is the ethno-cultural fragmentation of
the Nigerian political body, sometimes crudely described as
"tribalism." Tribalism dictates zero sum political and economic
policies and systems that are manifest in the institutionalized
domination and exploitation of ethnic minorities such as the
Ogoni.
B. The Ogoni People
The Ogoni People comprise an ethnic minority group in the
Rivers state of Nigeria. Ogoniland is made up of 6 kingdoms:
Eleme, Tai, Gokana, Babbe, Khenkhana and Nyokhana. 6 A
leading traditional chief, the Gbenemene, heads each kingdom. 7
4. See ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT, EIU COUNTRY PROFILE-NIGERIA 1996-
97, 17 (1996).
5. See id. at 3.
6. See Obiora Okwu-Okafor, Self-Determination and the Struggle for Ethno-
Cultural Autonomy in Nigeria: The Zangon Kataf and Ogoni Problems, 6 ASICL PROC.
114(1994).
7. See id.
19971
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All other chiefs owe allegiance to the Gbenemene in Council.8
Approximately 500,000 Ogoni occupy roughly 1000 square
kilometers of ancestral lands.9 The Ogoni nation is located in the
Niger Delta area, which has vast crude oil deposits as well as very
fertile land. The Delta area has been characterized as Nigeria's
"food-basket." 10  The residents in the Delta are traditionally
farmers, fishermen and hunters. Despite the poverty in Ogo-
niland, which is extreme even under Nigeria's internationally low
standards, the Ogoni are a proud and politically well-informed
people. 11
Ogoni occupation of the Niger Delta dates back beyond the
eighteenth century. 12 They are one of the many ethnic groups in
Nigeria that have zealously preserved their traditional political
structures despite the incursions of Western civilization. The
Ogoni have a distinct culture, language, and history, and have tra-
ditional religious and political systems that are different even from
the Andonis and Okrikas, their close neighbors. 13
C. Ogoni Oil and Environment
In 1958, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria
(SPDC), a multinational company owned by the British and
Dutch, and incorporated under Nigerian law as a limited liability
company, struck oil in Ogoniland. 14 Thereafter, the SPDC discov-
ered 5 oil fields yielding over 100 oil wells in Bomu, Korokoro,
Yorla, Bodo West, and Ebubu.15 In 1973, oil production in Ogo-
niland peaked at about 108,000 barrels per day, representing 25%
of Nigeria's total production. 16 By early 1993, however, Ogo-
8. See id.
9. See The Ogoni Issue: An Official Statement, issued by SPDC (Jan. 1995)
(manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter SPDC].
10. See Comment, THE NEWS (Nig.), May 17,1993, at 18-19.
11. See Collins Obibi, A People Divided by Death, GUARDIAN (Nig.), Nov. 28, 1995,
at 11.
12. See Okwu-Okafor, supra note 6, at 144.
13. See id.
14. See Oteri Akomeno, Concerning Oil Production, GUARDIAN (Nig.), Dec. 15,
1995, at 12.
15. See id.
16. See Emeka Achebe, Shell in Nigeria (Jan. 1996) (paper presented to the Com-
mission for Development and Cooperation of the European Parliament at Brussels)
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niland's oil production potential had fallen to 28,000 barrels per
day, less than 1.5% of Nigeria's total oil production. 17 Since its in-
ception, total oil production in Ogoniland has officially been stated
as 634,000,000 barrels. 18
The Ogoni complain that they have lost vast expanses of land
to oil prospecting and, consequently, have been forced into smaller
land areas. This has resulted in population density peaking at
about 500 people per square kilometer. This is an astounding
number when compared to the Nigerian national average of 270
people per square kilometer. 19 The population density has exac-
erbated hunger, disease, and has made the absence of basic social
amenities such as piped water, electricity, and good roads more
pronounced. Additionally, the Ogoni allege that the new oil wells,
extensive pipeline networks, and oil spills have destroyed arable
land necessary for agriculture, one of their main sources of in-
come. 20 Oil spills have affected what little land remains. The
Ogoni complain that food production has declined due to the envi-
ronmental pollution and pressure on the land. The pollution is
said to result from daily gas flaring, and resultant emissions of car-
bon monoxide, carbon dioxide, soot, methane, and other sub-
stances that reduce soil fertility and pollute the water used for
drinking and fisheries. 21
The Ogoni believe that they are being subjected to a slow, but
steady process of environmental genocide, forcing them to move
to neighboring areas. 22 The increased migration of the Ogoni to
Cameroon and Gabon in search of a better life is said to threaten
the Ogoni cultural identity.23 Dr. G.B. Leton, an Ogoni leader,
articulated this passionate feeling of deprivation in his preface to
the Ogoni Bill of Rights:
(manuscript on file with author).
17. See id. at 3.
18. See SPDC, supra note 9.
19. See Comment, supra note 10.
20. Official government statistics show that, between 1976 and 1991, there were 2976
oil spills. See Okwu-Okafor, supra note 6.
21. See id. Daily gas flaring is the method of oil production used throughout Nigeria.
See id.
22. See id.
23. See Ateri Emmanuel, When Ogoni Got a U.N. Hearing, GUARDIAN (Nig.), Sept.
14, 1993, at 7.
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All one sees and feels around is death. Death is everywhere in
Ogoniland. Ogoni language is dying. Ogoni culture is dying.
Ogoni people, Ogoni animals, Ogoni fish are dying because of
33 years of hazardous environmental pollution and resulting
food scarcity. In spite of an alarming density of population,
American and British oil companies greatly encroach on more
and more Ogoni land, depriving the peasants of their own
means of livelihood. Mining rents and royalties for Ogoni are
seized by the Federal Government of Nigeria which offers the
Ogoni people nothing in return, Ogoni is being killed so that
Nigeria can live. 24
In response to these charges, the SPDC responded that:
There has certainly been oil spillage in Ogoni land. And this
creates a real environmental problem, though this is far from
devastation . . . although the highest priority areas for action
are those such as over-fishing, deforestation, poor agricultural
practices and overpopulation, there is a need for action on oil
pollution and on gas-flaring.
25
The SPDC admitted that although there are environmental
problems, the SPDC is not legally responsible on the grounds that
its environmental performance, which it argues should be exam-
ined in the context of Nigeria's socioeconomic problems, is consis-
tent with Principle II of the Rio-Declaration from the Earth
Summit in June 1992.26 The SPDC also passed the blame to the
Nigerian government becaus e, under their joint-venture partner-
ship, the government should have used the royalties from the
SPDC's oil production to support the community.
27
In contrast to the SPDC's position, independent, non-African
experts and organizations perceive the environmental standards in
the Niger Delta as a real threat to its inhabitants. 2 8 These critics
include Lord Avebury, President of the British Parliamentary hu-
24. See Comment, supra note 10. Ken Saro Wiwa expressed the same sentiment:
"I'm seeing soldiers, bandits, actually coming to take away this stuff [crude oil] and de-
velop their own home while pretending to be running Nigeria. Oil has brought nothing
but disaster to our people." Id. at 23.
25. Achebe, supra note 16, at 4 (emphasis added).
26. See SPDC, supra note 9, at 6.
27. See Obibi, supra note 11.
28. See THE NEWS (Nig.), June 7, 1993, at 16.
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man rights group, Greenpeace International; 29 Aquatic Environ-
ment Consultants of U.K.; 30 World Bank and European Parlia-
ment;31  Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization
(UNPO) of the Hague; 32 and Amnesty International. The docu-
mentary, The Drilling Fields,33 also portrays the environmental
devastation and the human misery resulting from armed brutality
in Ogoniland. These independent non-African assessments lend
support to, if not vindicate, the Ogoni claim of environmental dev-
astation.
D. The Ogoni Struggle
In October 1990, the Ogoni presented to the military govern-
ment of General Ibrahim Babangida the Ogoni Bill of Rights,
which articulated their struggle. 34 The Bill demanded the follow-
ing:
1. Political control of Ogoni affairs by the Ogoni people.
2. The right to control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni
economic resources for Ogoni development.
3. Adequate and direct representation as of right in all Nige-
rian national institutions.
4. The use and development of Ogoni culture, religion and
language in Ogoni territory.
5. The right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology
from further devastation. 35
By December 1992, the Ogoni demands were revised toalso
include:
6. Political self-determination.
7. Ownership of the oil beneath Ogoni land.
29. See TELL (Nig.), No. 6, Feb. 8, 1993, at 28.
30. See Statement issued by the Ogoni Community Association-U.K. (1995) (on file
with author).
31. See id. at 4. The World Bank attributes the environmental devastation more to
over-farming, deforestation and population than to oil production. See Paul Lewis, Nige-
ria's Deadly Oil War: Shell Defends Its Record, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1996, at A14.
32. The UNPO conducted a physical inspection of Ogoni land in February 1995. See
Adekunle Adekoya, Ogoni: One Year Ago, VANGUARD (Nig.), May 24, 1995, at 6.
33. THE DRILLING FIELDS (Catma Films 1994).
34. See Emmanuel, supra note 23.
35. See SPDC, supra note 9.
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8. Six billion dollars in rent and royalties and four billion
dollars for environmental devastation from SPDC.
36
9. Secession from Nigeria.
37
The Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP),
formed in 1990 for the realization of the Ogoni Bill of Rights ide-
als, conveyed these demands to the international community in
July of 1992, through Ken Saro Wiwa's address to the United Na-
tions Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Geneva. 38 In
August, 1993, MOSOP obtained a hearing before the 45th Session
of the U.N. Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, and the 43rd Session of the U.N.
Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD). 39
Several international non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) accredited to the United Nations also pleaded the Ogoni
cause during the hearings.40 Shanti Sadiq, the United Nation's
rapporteur for the CERD Session on Nigeria, expressed the
committee members' concern regarding the overwhelming evi-
36. See id.
37. See Lewis, supra note 31. None of the documents articulated a secession claim,
however, certain activities and conduct of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
(MOSOP) strongly implied that there was a fight for secession. For example, the design-
ing of an Ogoni flag, the adoption of an Ogoni national anthem, and Mr. Saro Wiwa's
designation as Ogoni President in official correspondence indicated the move for an inde-
pendent Ogoniland. See id.
38. In what became a restatement of MOSOP's commitment to a non-violent strug-
gle, Ken Saro Wiwa noted:
First this matter was raised with the government and when they did
not listen, I made it a national issue .... We then took the matter to
the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). The
government ignored it. Now that the matter has been heard by the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights and the CERD, if the govern-
ment and Shell still ignore our case, I will have no alternative than to
present the case of genocide to the United Nations Security Council
where genocide is regarded as a very serious crime and I expect that
the U.N. will then intervene in the situation directly.
Emmanuel, supra note 23.
39. See id.
40. See id. The NGOs included Anti-Racism Information Service (ARIS) (Geneva);
Community of the Peace People (Belfast); Greenpeace International (U.K.); Support
Group for Indigenous People; International Federation for the Protection of Ethnic, Re-
ligious, Linguistic and other Minorities; and the Rain Forest Action Network. See id.
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dence of Ogoniland's ecological devastation and the government's
violent repression of the Ogoni struggle. She called on the Nige-
rian government to reassess its activities in Ogoniland.41 In a
scathing indictment of the SPDC, another committee member de-
scribed the Ogoni situation as "development racism.."
42
E. The Government's Reaction to the Struggle
The Nigerian Land Use Decree of 1978 vests in the Nigerian
government both land ownership and rights to subsurface re-
sources. With these rights the government collects all accrued
rents and royalties. 43 The federal government allocates revenue to
states based on a derivation principle that considers the resources
generated from the state, as well as the state's population and land
mass.44 The foregoing scheme, however, did not adequately pro-
tect particular communities. 4
5
In a placatory move, the government established the Oil Min-
eral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), to
which was allocated three percent of oil revenue for the oil produc-
ing communities' development. 46 The government designated an
additional 1.5% of oil revenues for an environmental fund.47 As
the SPDC observed, however, little of these funds actually reached
the target communities.48 Evidently, the 1993 expulsion of the
SPDC from Ogoniland marked the turning point of the govern-
ment's attitude towards the Ogoni struggle.
In 1993, Nigeria enacted Decree 107 of 1993, which suspended
its 1979 Constitution by empowering the military dictatorship to
rule by decrees. Thereafter, the government promulgated an anti-
secession decree entitled the Treason and Treasonable Decree of
1993. This was followed by the Nigerian Lands (Title Vesting)
Decree, which consolidated the government's hold on mineral re-
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. See SPDC, supra note 9, at 3.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
8191997]
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sources.49 The Nigerian Lands Decree reaffirmed government
ownership of all land in Nigeria, including land within 100 meters
of the shoreline and other land reclaimed from any lagoon, sea, or
ocean on or bordering Nigeria. 50 Section six of the decree with-
holds jurisdiction from any court in Nigeria to entertain any matter
in connection with the decree's validity or any government act
based on the decree. 51 In addition, the section does not allow an
inquiry into whether the decree or its implementation has contra-
vened any of the fundamental human rights provisions in the Ni-
gerian Constitution (1979) or the African Charter (Banjul Charter)
on Human and People's Rights. 52 These decrees effectively deny
constitutional relief to the Ogoni as well as other similarly situated
communities seeking judicial review.
Based on the SPDC's request for security at their installations
in Ogoniland, the Government dispatched a special armed unit
comprised of soldiers and riot police called the Internal Security
Task Force of Rivers State into Ogoniland. This task force, led by
Major Paul Okuntimo, was allegedly ordered to execute vocal
Ogoni in actions calling for "wasting targets" 53 under the false
auspices of inter-communal clashes. 54
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, ch. 10 (990).
53. See Lewis, supra note 31. Lewis reported that internal military documents show
the government hoped that by crushing the Ogoni protests it would persuade Shell to re-
sume operations in the region. In May 1994, the commander of an internal security task
force, Major Paul Okuntimo, wrote to his superior, Lt. Col. Dauda Komo, the Military
Administrator of Rivers State which includes Ogoniland. The message which dissidents
later obtained said that "Shell operations were still impossible unless ruthless military op-
erations are undertaken." Id. The letter called for wasting targets cutting across com-
munities and leadership cadres especially vocal individuals. It detailed special allowances
for troops and suggested applying pressure on oil companies to help pay the cost of the
operation. See id.
In Nigeria, Adekoya reported:
Since the outset of what one may now call the Ogoni debacle, a security outfit
known as Internal Security Task Force headed by Lt. Col Paul Okuntimo has
held sway in Ogoniland, and from then on peace has eluded sections of remain-
ing Ogoni leadership. Mr. Sorle Zorbani, acting president of Council of Ogoni
professionals observed that troops of the task force have been carrying out peri-
odical raids and have looted, burnt houses and raped women.
Adekoya, supra note 32, at 6.
54. Particularly revealing was an incident in 1994 when gunmen attacked a boat mid-
820 [Vol. 19:811
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The Government's contempt for the Ogoni cause was clear.
While the 1993 session of the U.N. CERD hearing on the Ogoni
issue was in progress, thirty-five people were killed and an entire
Ogoni village destroyed in one of the alleged inter-communal
clashes between the Ogoni and Andoni. 55 The Nigerian Ambas-
sador's explanation to the Committee about the killings was that
"some other tribes pounced on the Ogoni to tell them they are not
the only ones who have oil! "56
The government's divisive tactics are alleged to have polar-
ized the MOSOP leadership into "liberal" and "radical" camps.
The Ogoni people branded the liberals as "vultures" 57 while secu-
rity operatives constantly harassed Ogoni leaders considered radi-
cals. 58 Following a mob attack against the liberals, who were
meeting at Gionkoo in Ogoniland, which resulted in the death of
four prominent Ogoni on May 21, 1994, a Special Tribunal con-
victed MOSOP leaders of murder.59
F. Reaction of the International Community
Following the conviction, the Commonwealth of Nations sus-
pended Nigeria's membership, while the United States and the
stream and massacred the occupants, including women and children. Although govern-
ment investigation's attributed the massacre to communal clashes, some survivors identi-
fied the assailants as security operatives. See Wole Soyinka, Why the General Killed, in
NIGERIAN CASE FILE: THE KEN SARA WIWA-OGONI HANDBOOK (Tejumola Olaniyan
ed. 1996). For an example of how the government constantly portrays the Ogoni as
fighting with their neighbors, the Okolomas, Andonis, and Okrikas.see KEN SARO WIWA,
PREFACE TO GENOCIDE IN NIGERIA: THE OGONI TRAGEDY 103 (1992). See also Obibi,
supra note 11.
55. See Emmanuel, supra note 23.
56. Id.
57. See Obibi, supra note 11. Obibi reports that:
Perhaps no one issue has contributed in unsettling the achievement of the
MOSOP demands than the introduction of the words "vultures" and "deal with,"
words used to describe dissenting voices in the modus operandi of accomplishing
the Ogoni Bill of Rights. They appear to have watered the ground for govern-
ment infiltration in the ranks of Ogoni leaders and the present clampdown in the
area.
Id.
58. See Adekoya, supra note 32.
59. See id. The tribunal, consisting of two judges and one soldier, sentenced the ac-
cused persons to death and granted them thirty days to appeal to the military ruling body.
The sentences were quickly upheld and the government executed the accused merely ten
days after the tribunal's ruling. See id.
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European Union recalled their ambassadors. 60 Within Africa,
South Africa campaigned for sanctions against the Nigerian gov-
ernment.61 On December 15, 1995, the U.N. General Assembly
passed a resolution condemning the executions. 62 The African
Commission on Human and People's Rights expressed concern
about human rights in Nigeria in its Final Communique issued on
December 20, 1995.63 In short, the world agreed that the trial and
execution of MOSOP leaders was a travesty of justice.
G. Preliminary Comment on Legitimacy of Ogoni Claims
The Ogoni allege that both the environmental devastation
and the Nigerian Government's violent oppression are resulting in
their slow and steady genocide. Although the government does
not deny the killings and destruction of Ogoni villages, it attributes
the devastation to inter-communal clashes. 64 The timing of the
anti-secession decree with the expulsion of SPDC from Ogoniland
in 1993, however, indicates that the government perceived the
Ogoni as a threat to national unity. Furthermore, the govern-
ment's use of soldiers, instead of normal police forces, to militarize
Ogoniland demonstrates its intent to forcibly suppress the, Ogoni
rather than maintain civil order. Additionally, the documentary
evidence of The Drilling Fields65 as well as the testimony of the
victims that their assailants were security operatives corroborate
the allegation of the "wasting operations."
The manner of the prosecution and execution of the MOSOP
leadership demonstrates the government's intent to suppress the
vocal Ogoni. The government had pronounced the accused per-
60. See Ehusani George, Peace is Harvest of Justice, GUARDIAN (Nig.), Dec. 7, 1995,
at 27.
61. See Obibi, supra note 11, at 12.
62. See White House Statement on U.N. Vote Condemning Execution in Nigeria, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Dec. 15, 1995.
63. See Final Communique, African Communication on Human and People's Rights,
Extraordinary Sess., Dec. 18-19, 1995.
64. See WIWA, supra note 54.
65. See THE DRILLING FIELDS, supra note 33. The Drilling Fields showed security
operatives in Ogoniland, oil blowouts, devastated lands whose surface were completely
covered by crude oil, destroyed villages, dismembered human bodies, and testimonies of
brutalized victims. See id.
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sons guilty even before their trials commenced. 66 The composition
of the trial panel, included a soldier, thus placing the government
in the position of both prosecutor and judge. This notion contra-
venes both the accused person's constitutional right to a fair hear-
ing and the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1995.67 Further, the law
under which the charges were brought unconstitutionally prohib-
ited judicial review of the proceedings, even though the conviction
resulted in capital punishment. 68 Notably, under the constitution
and criminal laws of Nigeria, orthodox courts and not government
tribunals should try murder cases. The trial law contravened the
safeguards that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) ap-
proved in 1994 to guarantee the protection of those facing the
death penalty. Finally, the hasty executions that followed in spite
of the Tribunal's thirty day reprieve to the convicts exemplified
the government's illicit intentions.
The Ogoni attribute the environmental devastation to over-
farming, over-fishing, and high population density. For instance,
increased prospecting and production of oil is alleged to have re-
sulted in a higher population density. Between the discovery of oil
in 1958 and the abandonment of production in 1993, SPDC ex-
panded operations to five oil fields and at least one hundred oil
wells. Conservative official records showed an alarming oil spill-
age rate at four per week. In addition, SPDC constructed on
Ogoniland a network of flowlines, pipelines, and access roads to
66. See Adekoya, supra note 32. Adekoya reports that on Sunday, May 22, one day
after the incident, the military administrator of Rivers State, Lt. Col. Komo, called a press
conference and stated:
I got a report that Mr. Ken Saro Wiwa was to campaign in Gokana area on Sat-
urday [the day of the murders]. It was against the election guidelines. I said he
should not be arrested but should be shown the campaign program of constitu-
tional conference elections .... After he had been stopped, he got news that
some Ogoni leaders were holding a meeting at Gionkoo. He felt the "vultures"
were planning against him .... I have directed that all those involved in the kill-
ing.., should be arrested. All MOSOP leaders are also to be arrested.
Id. (emphasis added). Lt. Col. Komo himself admitted that Saro Wiwa was restrained
from entering Ogoniland, much less Gionkoo, the scene of the murders. His conjecture
that Saro Wiwa "felt the vultures were planning against him," stated the official position,
and his non discriminatory order of arrest of the entire MOSOP leadership verified the
political undertones of the entire exercise. See id.
67. See id.
68. See The Civil Disturbances (Special Tribunal) Decree No. 2 (1987) (Nig.).
1997]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
facilitate production. Against the backdrop of a limited land area
of 1000 square kilometers and a typical subsistence economy that
depends heavily on the traditional farming methods of bush burn-
ing and shifting cultivation, the link between oil production pres-
sures on land and over-farming readily falls into place. Thus,
over-fishing and increasing population density are inevitable logi-
cal consequences.
Nevertheless, some argue that Principle II of the Rio Decla-
ration justified SPDC's environmental standards in Ogoniland be-
cause it is the government's responsibility69 to satisfy the commu-
nity's economic needs.70 On the one hand, the issue of who is
responsible for the environmental devastation does not detract
from the legitimacy of the Ogoni claim to self-determination. On
the other hand, it is a deliberzate misinterpretation to assert that
the environmental standards in Ogoniland can be justified when
international law prescribes a minimum standard of environmental
protection that guarantees the healthy and productive life of its in-
habitants.71 The Ogoni standard falls well below this minimum.
Although the Nigerian government failed to discharge its con-
stitutional and purported international legal responsibility, SPDC
also bears an international legal responsibility. The Banjul Char-
ter confers equal juridical status to group rights as fundamental
human rights. 72 It elevates rights of people as sui generis rights,
69. See Lewis, supra note 31. "Shell attributes Mr. Saro-Wiwa's success in gradually
taking control of the movement and radicalizing it to the continuing poverty of the Ogoni,
as promises of more federal aid never materialized. Most villagers still lack even electric-
ity and piped water. For this, Shell blames the government." Id.
70. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Declaration
(1992), reprinted in 68 THE FORESTRY CHRONICLE 430 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declara-
tion]. Principle I1 provides that "environmental standards, management objectives and
priorities should reflect the environmental and development context to which they apply.
Standards applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic
and social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries." Id.
71. See id.; see also Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1992) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
Principle One provides that "man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and
adequate conditions of life in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and
well being." Id.
72. See African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, 21 I.L.M. 59 [hereinafter
Banjul Charter]. Article 24 provides: "All peoples shall have the right to a general satis-
factory environment favorable to their development." Id. at 63. Paragraph five of the
Preamble provides: "Recognizing on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem
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which are necessary to guarantee the national and international
protection of human rights. Thus, under the Charter, the Ogoni
have the right to a satisfactory environment favorable to their de-
velopment.
The Banjul Charter imposes a positive duty on the Nigerian
government as a signatory, to ensure implementation of a healthy
and productive environment. The Charter also imposes a negative
duty on the world at large, including the SPDC, a corporate entity
in Nigeria bound by laws applicable to the country, not to violate
this right or to prevent its enjoyment. The SPDC's legal obliga-
tion, therefore, is to ensure that its activities do not infringe on the
Ogoni rights. Conversely, the SPDC has a positive legal respon-
sibility when continuing with oil production in Ogoniland to en-
sure preservation of the environment's healthiness and productive
capacity. These obligations are independent of any joint venture
agreements the SPDC has with the Nigerian government.
In addition to the Banjul Charter, other declaratory interna-
tional instruments also impose responsibility on states, as well as
on citizens, communities,- enterprises, and institutions to protect
the environment.73 During its discussion of the responsibility of
private and public enterprises, the U.N. World Commission on
Environment and Development (WCED) noted that most agen-
cies:
[H]ave been confined by their own mandates to focusing on the
effects. Today, the sources of those effects must be tackled....
Environmental protection and sustainable development must
be an integral part of the mandates of all agencies of govern-
ments, of international organizations and of major private-
sector institutions.74
Although the Rio and Stockholm Declarations are not interna-
tional law, they constitute evidence of globally accepted normative
principles.
SPDC's responsibility also arises from the criminal killing of
Ogoni people and the environment's devastation. The former act
from the attributes of human beings, which justifies their national and international pro-
tection and on the other hand, that the reality and respect of people's rights should neces-
sarily guarantee human rights." Id. at 59.
73. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 71, at 1417.
74. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 310 (1987).
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falls within Article 11(a) of the U.N. Genocide Convention.
75
SPDC's complicity can be inferred from all of the following: its
position as the instrument of the Ogoni environment's destruction;
its request for and financing of the militarization of Ogoniland; its
self-confessed arms importation for security operatives in Ogo-
niland;76 and its curious participation through representation of le-
gal counsel in the criminal trial in which Ogoni leaders were exe-
cuted without effective legal representation. 77 On environmental
75. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
U.N. GAOR 3d. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (1951).
Article 1I provides that:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.
Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
Article III provides:
The following acts shall be punishable;
(a) [g]enocide;
(b) [c]onspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) [djirect and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) [a]ttempt to commit genocide;
(e) [c]omplicity in genocide.
Id. at 8.
Article IV provides that "[plersons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumer-
ated in Article III shall be punished whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers,
public officials or private individuals." Id. at 8.
76. See Lewis, supra note 31. Lewis indicated:
Shell [SPDC] officials fervently deny doing anything more than trying to protect
company personnel and equipment and say they had no control over the actions
of the Nigerian security services. They said it was not unusual for companies
seeking protection to pay transportation costs and salary supplements for troops
living outside their barracks.
Id. at Al.
Mr. Gabriel Akinluyi, a Chief Executive of SPDC, reportedly swore in an affidavit that
the arms were meant for security operatives all over the country. See TELL (Nig.), Jan.
29, 1996, at 34. This defense begs the question: what is the connection between oil pro-
duction and importation of arms by SPDC whose interest exist mainly in the Niger Delta?
77. See Michael Birnbaum, Q.C., NIGERIA FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DENIED (1995)
(reporting the trial of Ken Saro Wiwa and others by the accredited representative of the
Law Society of England and Wales, and the Bar Human Rights Committee of England
and Wales) (on file with the author).
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devastation criminality, SPDC persisted with oil production until
1993 on the ground that it was the government which had the con-
tractual obligation to deal with the environment. Nonetheless,
SPDC knew that Government measures never had any real im-
pact. This continued production is a reckless disregard for human
life sufficient to constitute environmental genocide under article
11(c).
The Nigerian government's expropriation of land and mineral
resources is of equal importance to the legitimacy of the Ogoni
claims. Occupation by immemorial possession is the oldest, most
widely accepted, and indeed, the founding principle through which
title to land is acquired,78 and Ogoni ancestral title certainly suf-
fices. Moreover, there is a positive global movement towards the
protection of indigenous peoples' land ownership. 79
Article 15 of the International Labour Organization Conven-
tion Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, No. 169,80 to which Nigeria is a signatory, sought to
protect indigenous people's ownership rights over the natural re-
sources of their lands. It provided for their participation in the
harvesting, use, management, and conservation of such natural re-
sources. 81 Mineral deposit ownership, however, continues to be
78. See generally GORDON BENNETT, ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1978).
79. See Douglas Sanders, Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples, in MODERN
LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 55-70 (Christian Tomuschet ed., 1993).
80. See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Coun-
tries, No. 169, June 27, 1989, 28 ILM 1382 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991). Article 15
provides:
1. The rights of peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their
lands shall be specifically safeguarded. These are rights the rights of peoples to
participate in the use, management and conservation of these resources.
2. In cases in which the state retains the ownership of mineral or sub- surface
resources or rights to other resources pertaining to the lands, governments shall
establish or maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peoples
with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be
prejudiced before undertaking or permitting any programs for the exploration or
exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands. The peoples concerned
shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall re-
ceive fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of
such activities.
Id.
81. See id.
1997]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
controversial. In the Lubicon Lake Band82 case, Lubicon Lake
Band asserted that Canada had violated its self-determination
right to freely dispose of its natural resources, by expropriating
part of the Band's territories in order to grant interests in gas and
oil exploration to private corporations. 83 The Commission held
the communication to be inadmissible on the ground that self-
determination was not an individual right enforceable through the
optional protocol procedure. 84  Comments on the merits of the
communication conceded, however, that
[N]ot many of the claims presented raise issues under Article 27
of the CCPR (Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) historical
inequities to which the state party refers, and certain more re-
cent developments threaten the way of life and culture of the
Lubicon Lake Band, and constitute a violation of Article 27 so
long as they continue.85
There is a suggestion that expropriation of ethnic minorities' lands
and resources without consent may constitute a threat to their way
of life and culture, and a denial of their rights under Article 27 of
the CCPR.
The Ogonis' dire environmental degradation presents a simi-
lar,,but much more serious situation than that in the Lubicon Lake
Band case, as the ongoing degradation also involves a threat to
their physical existence. 86 It is undisputed that where a govern-
ment assumes ownership of lands and mineral deposits, it holds
and manages the property in trust for all peoples. 87 In the Nige-
82. The Lubicon Lake Band Case, Communication 167\1984 U.N. Doc
CCPR\38\D\167\1984 (Mar. 28, 1990).
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See BENNETT, supra note 78.
86. See id.
87. See id. This presumption derives from the common law interpretation of owner-
ship, which vests same on the Crown with individuals retaining mere "estates" in the land.
In the Nigerian case of Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, S. Nig., 2 A.C. 399 (1921), while com-
menting on land ownership in Southern Nigeria, to which the Ogoni belong, the Privy
Council held that:
[l~n interpreting the native title to land, not only in Southern Nigeria, but other
parts of the British Empire, much caution. is essential. There is a tendency, op-
erating at times unconsciously, to render that title conceptually in terms which
are appropriate only to systems which have grown up under English law ... as a
rule, in the various systems of native jurisprudence throughout the empire, there
[Vol. 19:811828
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rian case, the Land Use Decree proclaims that ownership is vested
in the government in trust for Nigeria's people.88 Under the law,
the trustee's failure to discharge his legal duty effectively relin-
quishes the trust and revests legal ownership in the beneficiary.
89
In Ogoniland, the Nigerian state as trustee coercively enforces its
possession of the trust property where the trust has not only failed,
but the trust property has been transformed into an instrument of
death.
The foregoing analysis clearly portrays the Ogoni people as
having suffered egregious violations of their human rights, envi-
ronmental rights, and property rights. The U.N. member states by
imposing sanctions on the Nigerian government, acknowledge that
the trial and execution of Ogoni leadership was a travesty of jus-
tice and conceivably, a "wasting" operation. It appears then, that
the United Nations tacitly endorse the legitimacy of the Ogoni
claims. If so, then what is the Ogoni's right to self-determination?
III. THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
A. Historical Perspective
During the Spanish "civilizing" conquests around the world in
the sixteenth century, Indians of the New World resisted the dep-
redations of the Spanish conquistadors by asserting and defending
their natural right to establish their own political societies. 90 So-
is no such full division between property and possession as English lawyers are
familiar with .... Their Lordships have elsewhere explained principles of this
kind in connection with the indian title to reserve lands in Canada .... In India,
as in Southern Nigeria, there is yet another feature of the fundamental nature of
the title to land which must be borne in mind. The title, such as it is, may not be
that of the individual, as in this country it nearly always is in some form, but may
be that of a community.
Id. at 402-03.
88. See Bennett, supra note 78.
89. See e.g., Te Teira Te Paea v. Te Roera Tareh [19021 A.C. 56 (expressing that use
of the word trust did not affect the reversionary fee simple ownership of a Maori claim-
ant); see also Tito v. Waddell, 2 W.L.R. 493, 596 (1977).
90. See L. HAWKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF
AMERICA (1949). The Spanish champions tried to evoke and exploit the sympathy of the
dominant Christian faith by arguing that because the Indians did not know Christianity,
they could not be living a life of political liberty and human dignity, that they were slaves
by nature, and the Spanish conquests was a just war against infidels. See also ROGER
MERRIMAN, THE RISE OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE 656-63 (1962). Pope Paul III declared
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cial contract philosophy and Thomist thought, perceived that
people's individual free consent legitimized their acquiescence to
the state or political system, underpinned this resistance. 91 Society
deemed consent so sacrosanct that even positivist hard-liners such
as Hobbes and Machiavelli conceded that it was an indispensable
condition for a stable and effective order.92 The religious doctrine
of Christianity and its transcendental individualism 93 provided the
initial condemnation of alien subjugation, which at the time, was
manifested in the trade of African slaves. 94 The medieval notions
of self-determination were an aspect of natural law. Although the
natural law theory centered on individual, rather than group rights,
Hugo Grotius,95 Emmerich De Vattel, and Johannes Althusus
96
appear to have broadened its scope by propounding a natural right
to secession.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the French Revolution
demonstrated that the medieval notions of self-determination had
been transformed into an effective political principle. A showing
of human solidarity demonstrated initial formulation of state obli-
gations to assist self-determination movements in alien states.
97
"the said Indians and all other people who may later be discovered by Christians, are by
no means to be deprived of their liberty or possession of their property, even though they
be outside the faith of Jesus Christ." Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L.
REV. 28,45 (1947).
91. For a discussion of Thomist thought, see R. TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES
(1979).
92. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple Order, Justice and the U.N: A
Dialectical View, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 325, 329 (1995).
93. These refer to the notion that a Christian person is a free individual in relation to
God.
94. See DAVID B. DAVIS, SLAVERY AND HUMAN PROGRESS, 304-05 (1984).
95. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLIS DE PACIS LIBRI TRES (1964), reprinted in
THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 260 (James Scott ed. & Francis Kelsey trans.,
1964). Grotius, a realist in the mould of Hobbes is often "credited" with the seculariza-
tion of natural law. Although Grotius advocates the inviolability of the initial social con-
tract and a lack of authority on the part of the people to repudiate the sovereign, he also
contends that a segment cannot unilaterally withdraw from the state "unless it is evident
that it cannot save itself in any other way." Id. at 261. This natural right to secession is
ostensibly an aspect of the exercise of the right to self-defense. See id.
96. See LEE BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION
46 (1978).
97. See Tom Farer & Felice Gaer, The UN. Human Rights: At the End of the Begin-
ning, in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD 242 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury
eds., 2d ed. 1993). The Anglo-French intervention in the Greek war of independence
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This sentiment of human solidarity ushered in the political concept
of self-determination during World War 1.98 Viewed as a "self-
determination" war, World War I initiated the legitimacy of lib-
eration efforts of oppressed peoples. 99
In the post World War I era, this concept failed to take an ef-
fective foothold as a legal right. During the Versailles Peace Con-
ference, "self-determination" served as an instrument of formal
imperialism. 100 In addition, the Versailles Peace Treaty created
special regimes of protection for limited clusters of peoples,10 1
which did not set a positive normative precedent. On the contrary,
and to the discomfort of the allied powers, Nazi-Germany ex-
ploited minority rights to justify its expansionist goals. This
marked the beginning of another World War. On the eve of the
United Nations' birth and on the former Soviet Union's insistence,
the concept of self-determination was received, at arms length, as
a principle clothed with ambiguity.
102
B. Legal Concept of Self-Determination
Political, economic, social, cultural, and linguistic factors have
dynamically altered the legal concept of self-determination. 10 3 Al-
from Ottoman rule was justified on the basis of human solidarity. See DOUGLAS DAKIN,
THE GREEK STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 1821-33 (1973).
98. United States President Woodrow Wilson is credited with its articulation. See
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 27-30
(1990).
99. See Farer & Gaer, supra note 97, at 243. Their observation that "one conse-
quence of the war [World War I] was to enhance the perceived legitimacy of individual
and group claims against the state is instructive." Id.
100. See Koskenniemi, supra note 92, at 332.
101. See Farer & Gaer, supra note 97, at 243.
102. See id. at 292. Opposition to the recognition of minority rights in the United Na-
tions was based on the grounds that:
[t]hey might again as during the 1930s serve as a pretext for foreign interven-
tion; that they encouraged separatist tendencies threatening the territorial in-
tegrity of existing states; that the diversity of the condition of minorities pre-
cluded the evolution of universal standards; and that they could generate special
measures of protection that would constitute reverse discrimination against ma-
jority interests.
Id.; see also FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING
TO ETHNIC, RELIGIONS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES, reprint of U.N. Doc.
E/CN4/Sub.2/384 and Adds. 1-7 (June 1977).
103. See Victor Segesvary, Group Rights: The Definition of Group Rights in the Con-
temporary Legal Debate Based on Socio-cultural Analysis, 3 INT'L J. GROUP RIGHTS 102
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though the scope and application of self-determination is unclear,
due to its inherent tension with the sanctity of the state, the legal
concept of self-determination has generally restricted the political
concept of self-determination to consent of the governed.
1°4
Therefore, the legal concept of self-determination has varied,
10 5
both in scope and application, in accordance with the oppression
and domination, and with the exigency of power politics and pri-
oritization of conflicting interests.
1. Normative Framework
The right to self-determination has been classified as a jus co-
gen, a peremptory norm of customary international law.106 By vir-
tue of this normative status, self-determination is valid and bind-
ing on all, irrespective of consent, and only a subsequent norm of
similar status can abridge or set it aside. 107 International instru-
ments and state practice, however, lack clarity on the exact scope
(1995).
104. The political concept of self-determination emphasizes the basic necessity of con-
sent of every person or group to any political arrangement. See JOHN DUNN, POLITICAL
OBLIGATION IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT 46 (1980). The legal concept of self-
determination, on the other hand, focuses on the tension between its liberation content
and the norms of territorial and political sovereignty. Consequently, legal self-
determination has defied a uniform normative definition. Its meaning has oscillated from
"a ... political idea ... preserving the character of the group," to "the freedom of a na-
tionality to determine its own political fate and to manage its own affairs." James
FAWCETT, THE LAW OF NATIONS 39 (1968); KULSKI, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN A
REVOLUTIONAR-, AGE 136 (1964); see also ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
105 (1963); ISA SHIVJI, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 80 (1989);
UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 192 (1972). Legal self-
determination has also been defined as "[t]he right of a people ... to determine their po-
litical and legal status as a separate entity" and as "embodying the quintessentially demo-
cratic concept of consent of the governed." F. PREZETACNIK, THE BASIC COLLECTIVE
HUMAN RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES AND NATIONS AS A PRE-
REQUISITE FOR PEACE: ITS PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND AND PRACTICAL AP-
PLICATION 263 (1991); Michael S. Carter, Ethnic Minority Groups and Self-
Determination: The Case of the Basques, 20 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 55,58 (1986).
105. See Okwu-Okafor, supra note 6, at 90.
106. See HECTOR GROS-ESPIELL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, IM-
PLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 11 (1980) (study report of Gros-
Espiell, Thematic Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities); see also Legal Consequences Case, 1971 I.C.J. 66, 69; Bar-
celona Traction Case, 1970 3 I.C.J. 304; South West Africa Case, 1966 I.C.J. 437; IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 515 (1990).
107. See BROWNLIE, supra note 106, at 514-15.
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and application of self-determination. Articles 1 and 55 of the
U.N. Charter provide for "equal rights and self-determination of
peoples" without defining the "peoples" subject to this right.
108
The United Nations' initial position was that this term exclusively
referred to colonial peoples and territories under alien domina-
tion. 10
9
The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples (Colonial Declaration) 110 confirmed this
restriction. The Colonial Declaration, however, elevated the ju-
ridical status of self-determination from a mere principle to a legal
right. 111 In 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 112 often referred to as the International Bill of
Rights, 113 restated the right to self-determination, but only listed
individual minority rights exercisable in community with the
group. Thus, it did not clearly advance the concept beyond the
colonial context.
The Declaration on Friendly Relations 114 introduced radical
108. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55; see also RUTH RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1945,810-11 (1958).
109. See GROS-ESPIELL, supra note 106. According to Gros-Espiell's report:
[Slelf-determination of peoples is a right of peoples, in other words of a specific
type of human community sharing a common desire to establish an entity capa-
ble of functioning to ensure a common future .... Under contemporary inter-
national law, minorities do not have this right. Modern international law has
deliberately attributed the right to peoples and not to nations and states The
United Nations has established the right of self determination as a right of peo-
ples under colonial and alien domination. The right does not apply to peoples
already organised in the form of a state which are not under colonial and alien
domination.
See id.
110. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. Doc. A/4884 1960, reprinted in 1960 U.N.Y.B. 49 [hereinafter Co-
lonial Declaration]. For a discussion of the history of the 1960 Declaration and its appli-
cation, see EDWARD LAWSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1333 (1991).
111. See id. at art. 1, 12.
112. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 360, 993 U.N.T.S. 33.
113. KATHERINE HALL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A RESOURCE
GUIDE 13 (1993).
114. Declaration on Principles of International Law, Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States and in Accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
changes to colonial self-determination. The declaration provided,
inter alia, for the preservation of the sovereign and independent
states' territorial integrity but subjected them to a limitation: the
state must be "possessed of a government representing the whole
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race,
creed or color."'115 This clause effectively established that self-
determination could be exercised in varying degrees and is not
necessarily coterminous with full independence. 116 This concept
has matured beyond the colonial context and is available to unrep-
resented peoples within a sovereign state. 117 The juridical status of
the Declaration on Friendly Relations is often questioned because
Declarations of the General Assembly are non-binding. The
General Assembly, however, adopted the Declaration without any
negative votes; 118 thus, the Declaration constitutes an opinio juris
sufficient for the establishment of a customary rule of international
law.119
Beyond the colonial context, the provisions of the Declaration
on Friendly Relations are not free from scope and application con-
troversies. According to Capotorti, contemporary international
law only recognizes a minority's right to self-determination if "a
minority has the right to be called people, and provided that the
state to which a minority group belongs is subject to a government
not representing the whole people without discrimination of race,
creed or color.' 20
The problems of clarity here are twofold. First, what degree
of representativeness will serve as a satisfactory test? Democracy
tions, Annex to G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028, reprinted in 9 ILM 1292 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
115. Id.
116. See Frederic Kirgis, The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations, 88
AM. J. INT'L L. 304, 305 (1994).
117. See A. CRISTESCU, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, HISTORICAL AND
CURRENT DEVELOPMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS INSTRUMENT, U.N.
Doc.E/CN4/Sub.2/LL04/Rev. 1 (1981).
118. See CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial World, in
MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 2 (1993).
119. See Kirgis, supra note 116, at 306. Moreover, this Article will later demonstrate
that state practice has confirmed the Declaration on Friendly Relations as authoritative
customary rules of international law. See id.
120. Francesco Capotorti, Are Minorities Entitled to Collective International Rights?,
20 ISR. Y.B. OF HUM. RTS. 355-56 (1990).
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easily offers itself as the best known representative political sys-
tem. Democracy, however, is founded on the principle of majori-
tarian rule and cannot adequately represent minorities. Neverthe-
less, many scholars interpret post-colonial self-determination as
the realization of a democratic government. 121 This perspective is
criticized as being founded on the false belief that the modern
democratic state is a closely knit community, which endorses com-
pulsory assimilation of minorities into the fictional community.122
In practice, the democratic test has failed as a viable solution to
the problems of minorities. 1
23
The second problem is the meaning of "people" and the re-
strictive content of "race, creed or color." UNESCO experts have
specified that "people" in international law share one or more of
the following characteristics: common historical tradition; racial or
ethnic identity; cultural homogeneity; linguistic unity; religious or
ideological affinity; territorial connection; and common economic
life.124
Legal scholars agree that overriding considerations in the
right to be called "people" include territoriality, a common his-
tory, culture, language, and a conscious desire to maintain a dis-
tinct identity from other groups. 125 Talcott Parson's definition of a
national group as a transgenerational group emphasizes the impor-
121. See M. POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE-THE NEW
DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 38 (1982).
122. See Segesvary, supra note 103.
123. The Canadian democracy has not prevented Quebec from seeking secession. On
the other hand, the Inuit have rejected the "representativity" test as "a far too easy test
for government to claim that they meet." Dietrich Murswick, The Issue of a Right of Se-
cession-Reconsidered, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 27 (Christian
Tomuschat ed., 1993). For example, the Inuit assert that the representatives of Quebec
separatist movement make the claim that they, as a nation, would represent the whole
people of the territory of Quebec, including the Inuit. "Our past and present experience
with the Quebec government regarding such a claim leads us to believe otherwise ....
Mere representation is inconsistent with the principles that the ICC and others have been
advocating ... namely the right to full and direct participation and the right to consent."
Id.
124. International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights
of Peoples, Paris Nov. 27-30, 1989, SHS 89/CONF. 602. This description has been criti-
cized as not accommodating diverse societies. See Patrick Thornbery, The Democratic or
Internal Aspect of Self-Determination, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 101,
124-25 (Christian Tomuschai ed., 1993).
125. See Okwu-Okafor, supra note 6, at 94.
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tance of the foregoing elements, and is substantially in accord with
the 1992 U.N. Declaration on Minorities' definition of "people" as
national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities. 126 The Vienna
Declaration of 1993127 rectified the restrictive contexts of race,
creed or color by using the phrase "without distinction of any
kind." 128
In 1992, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopted the
Declaration on The Rights of Persons Belonging to National,
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. 129 The Declaration's
most pragmatic provision is the requirement that minority groups
be granted participation in all affairs or matters related to their
lives or territory.130 A stipulation that such participation may be
denied if it is incompatible with national legislation, however,
eroded any value the Declaration might have had. The Declara-
tion appears to adhere to the view that minorities collectively are
not subjects of the right of self-determination. Based on provi-
sions of international multilateral instruments alone, the scope and
application of the self-determination 'concept beyond the colonial
context remains an unsolved riddle.
Regional instruments have had a greater measure of clarity.
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Banjul Char-
ter),131 which was intended to be "an instrument based upon an
African legal philosophy and responsive to African needs,"'1 32 un-
doubtedly was the first regional document to recognize groups as
subjects of the self-determination right beyond the colonial con-
126. See Talcott Parsons, Some Theoretical Considerations on the Nature and Trends of
Change of Ethnicity, in ETHNICITY THEORY AND EXPERIENCE 7-8 (Matthew Glazer et
al. eds., 1975).
127. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, pt. 1, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF,
157/24 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M 1661 (1993).
128. Id.
129. Declaration on The Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135 (1992), reprinted in The Report of the Work-
ing Group on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Lin-
guistic Minorities U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/992/48 16-19 (1992).
130. See id.
131. Banjul Charter, supra note 72.
132. Richard Gittleman, Introductory Note, The Organization of African Unity: Banjul
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 21 1.L.M. 58 (1982).
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text. 133 Article 20 of the Banjul Charter provides for two distinct
subjects of the right: colonized people and oppressed people.
134
Paragraph 9 of the preamble puts the meaning of oppressed people
in proper perspective. It states that liberation struggles within the
Charter are to be seen in light of peoples that "are still struggling
for their dignity and genuine independence," and obliges states to
eliminate discrimination based on race, ethnic group, color, sex
language, religion or political opinions.135 Although territoriality
circumscribes the inherence of self-determination within the
Banjul Charter, the oppressed ethnic group stands out as a benefi-
ciary of the right. Article 19 of the Charter, which prohibits domi-
nation of a people by another people, 136 obviously accommodates
the dominated ethnic group as "peoples" within the Charter.
There are also grounds for further argument that references to
"foreign domination" within the Charter were intended to ac-
commodate the pre-colonial state.
137
The expressed intent of the Banjul Charter to "eradicate all
forms of colonialism from Africa" may have looked beyond the
1960 decolonization process-given that this statement was in
1981, when virtually all European colonies had been liberated.
138
133. Banjul Charter, supra note 72, at 62. Article 20 of the Banjul Charter provides:
1. All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestion-
able and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine
their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development ac-
cording to the policy they have freely chosen.
2. Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from
the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the interna-
tional community.
3. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States parties to the
present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it po-
litical, economic or cultural.
Id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 59.
136. See id. at 62. Article 19 provides that: "All peoples shall be equal; they shall en-
joy the same respect and shall have the same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination
of a people by another." Id.
137. See id. at 59-68.
138. See id. at 59. Paragraph 4 of the preamble, states that:
[R]eaffirming the pledge they solemnly made in Article 2 of the said Charter to
eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, to coordinate and intensify their
cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa and to
promote international cooperation having due regard to the Charter of the
83719971
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From this perspective, "all forms of colonialism" could potentially
mean all the consequences and ramifications of colonialism in the
post-colonial state, both internally and externally. Some of these
ramifications can be obtained from paragraph nine of the Pream-
ble.139 They include external consequences of colonialism, such as:
colonialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism, and apartheid; as well as
internal consequences such as the struggle for dignity. The forego-
ing analysis is yet to be supported by state practice, but it arguably
has some support from the Gros-Espiell report. 140
Gros-Espiell's report appears to expand colonial or alien
domination to include fictional national unity that disguises colo-
nial or alien domination, denial of the self-determination right to
the people, and absence of a people's free and voluntary submis-
sion to the state's legal order. 14 1 A practical illustration of such a
situation could be Rwanda, where Belgian colonial rule led to. the
Tutsis' political domination of the Hutus.142 Specifically in 1950,
the Belgians installed the Tutsis on the pretext that they were the
natural de facto rulers under the indirect rule system. 143 The Tut-
sis, therefore received eighty-three percent of political and strate-
gic economic positions.144 The Tutsis domination of Hutus in both
Rwanda and Burundi and the resulting civil wars are the conse-
quences of colonialism within Gros-Espiell's amplification.
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Id.
139. See id.
140. See GROS-EsPIELL, supra note 106, at 10. Gros-Espiell reported that "If how-
ever beneath the guise of ostensible national unity, colonial and alien domination does in
fact exist whatever legal formula may be used in an attempt to conceal it, the right of the
subject people concerned cannot be disregarded without international law being vio-
lated." Id. Furthermore, he observed that:
[Clolonial and alien domination mean any kind of domination whatever form it
may take, which the people concerned freely regards as such. It entails denial of
the right of self determination to a people possessing that right by an external
alien source. Conversely, colonial and alien domination does not exist where a
people lives freely and voluntarily under the legal order of a state ... provided it
is real and not mere legal fiction.
Id.
141. See id.
142. See Makau wa Mutua, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of
-Legitimate Authority, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 505, 521 (1995) citing DIXON KAMUKAMA,
RWANDA CONFLICT: ITS ROOTS AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS 21 (1993).
143. See id.
144. See id.
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Other notable regional instruments are the Helsinki Final
Act, 145 the Proposal for a European Convention for the Protection
of Minorities, 146 which recognizes the minority as a collectivity,
and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages,
147
which presents the most comprehensive attempt to preserve the
language of minority groups. These instruments do not, however,
establish a consensus on the minority as a collectivity with the right
of self-determination. Just like the International Bill of Rights,
they portray deliberate efforts to deal extensively with minority
problems, but on the basis of individual rights exercisable in a
community within a group.
There has been, however, unparalleled progress in the minor-
ity group distinctly referred to as indigenous peoples. Some schol-
ars treat this class as a special category of minorities because of
their greater degree of cultural differences and vulnerability. 148
Experts believe that there is a need to decolonize their lingering
colonial status. 149
Indigenous people have been defined as:
[A] collectivity which has descent from the earliest surviving
population in the part of the state where the people tradition-
ally lives (whether still living in that area, or as a result of invol-
145. Conference on Security & Cooperation in Europe on the Human Dimension
adopted June 29, 1990, reprinted in HURST HANNUM, DOCUMENTS ON AUTONOMY AND
MINORITY RIGHTS 35 (1990). This document reformed the "individual" perspective of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 35 obliges the state
party to ensure the national minorities' effective participation in public affairs, noting the
possibility of appropriate local or autonomous administrations. See id.
146. See EUR. COUNCIL Doc. (CDL 91) 7 (1991). This document not only recognizes
groups as subjects of rights but also seeks to place these rights on the agenda of human
rights protection. Chapter 1 provides, inter alia, that "the International Protection of the
rights of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities as well as the rights of individuals be-
longing to those minorities, as guaranteed by the present convention, is a fundamental
component of the international protection of human rights, and as such falls within the
scope of international cooperation." Id. at ch. 1. Article 2 defines minority as "a group
which is smaller in number than the rest of the population of a state, whose members who
are nationals of that State, have ethical, religious or linguistic features different from
those of the rest of the population, and are guided by the will to safeguard their culture,
traditions, religion or language." Id. at art. 2.
147. See, HURST HANNUM, DOCUMENTS ON AUTONOMY AND MINORITY RIGHTS 86-
101 (1990).
148. See Sanders, supra note 79, at 71.
149. See id.
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untary relocation in another part of the state) and which has a
distinct identity associated with its history.
150
International organizations consider cultural groupings in Africa
to be entitled to the indigenous peoples classification.151 Specifi-
cally, the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations con-
sider the Ogoni as indigenous peoples. 152 The history of pre-
colonial Africa's "terra nullius" and classless "tribes" reveal well-
established political kingdoms and empires based on ethno-
cultural distinctions. 153 There exists substantial support for the ar-
gument that the most widespread feature of unique culturally ho-
mogenous ethnic groups, which are transgenerationalwith pre-
colonial ancestral territoriality, is most evident in post-colonial
Africa.154 In other words, post-colonial Africa is largely an arbi-
trary amalgamation of diverse indigenous peoples in political
structures of inequality. 155
150. Douglas Sanders, Indigenous Peoples at the United Nations (manuscript on file
with author). In the Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independ-
ent Countries, indigenous people are defined as:
[P]eoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of
their descent from the population which inhabited the country, or a geographical
region to which the country belongs at the time of conquest or colonization or the
establishment of present state boundaries and who irrespective of their legal status,
retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.
See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, No.
169, supra note 80; see also Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, 15
OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 237 (1990).
151. See INTERNATIONAL WORK GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, COVERAGE IN
THE INDIGENOUS WORLD 1994-95 (1995) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL WORK GROUP];
see also D. Murmur, The Concept of Indigenous Peoples in Africa, INDIGENOUS AFF. 52-
56 (1994).
152. See INTERNATIONAL WORK GROUP, supra note 151.
153. See OKWUDIBA NNOLI, ETHNIC POLITICS IN NIGERIA (1978). In Nigeria, there
were the Benin Kingdom, the Fulani Empire, the egalitarian Ibo Traditional Society, the
Sultanate of Sokoto, Emirates of Kano and Katsina, and other kingdoms ruled by Obas
and Chiefs in the East and West. This was a common feature of pre-colonial African
landscape. See MANDANI POLITICS FORMATIONS IN UGANDA AND CLASS (1976).
154. See Segesvary, supra note 103, at 102 (observing that the African cultural group
whose distinctiveness is normally a result of a created cultural environment serves as the
best evidence of a cultural group entitled to sui generis rights on basis of distinctive sym-
bolic orderings, belief and value systems, and particularly shared historical experience).
155. Professor Okwudibia Nnoli observed that the colonial administrative "divide and
rule" policy translated into ethnic domination political structures, which have only be-
come more pronounced today with the collapse of the Cold War. See NNOLI, supra note
840
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The Draft Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples 156
presently before the U.N. Human Rights Committee, provides that
"indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination, in ac-
cordance with international law by virtue of which they may freely
determine their political status and institutions and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development. An integral part
of this is the right to autonomy and self-government. ' 157 Para-
graph four, however, qualifies the scope of the self-determination
by providing that:
[N]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying
for any state, group or individual any right to engage in any ac-
tivity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the
United Nations or to the Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law concerning Friendly Relations and cooperation
among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions. 15
8
Paragraph four may have re-introduced the ambiguities that were
created in the Declaration on Friendly Relations regarding the
scope of self-determination. Professor Douglas Sanders correctly
argues that if self-determination survives in a final declaration, it
should, at the least, legitimize the self-government rights or
autonomy for territorially-based indigenous peoples within sover-
eign states. 159 As a consequence, indigenous peoples who traverse
post-colonial Africa could demand self-government or autonomy
without being oppressed or dominated, as the definitions of in-
digenous peoples do not require this condition. Thus, evidence of
domination or oppression could then be construed as an outright
denial of the right to autonomy or self-government and may jus-
tify the more drastic step of secession, especially if accompanied
by egregious violations of human rights. It is, however, not certain
that this is the intended result of the Draft Declaration. 160 By and
153 at 25; see also NGUGI WA THIONG, Mau-Mau is Coming Back in Ngugi Wa Thiongo,
in BARREL OF A PEN: RESISTANCE TO REPRESSION IN NEO-COLONIAL KENYA (1983)
(noting that after independence "there was a rush to Africanize the inequalities of the
colonial era").
156. See Annex to the Report of the WGIP, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.211993/29 (1993).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Sanders, supra note 79, at 81.
160. See The United Nations at 50: Notes for Speakers, U.N.JD.P.I. Pub. 76-77 (1995).
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large, the Declaration on Friendly Relations remains the authori-
tative statement on post-colonial self-determination.
2. State Practice
According to Professor Frederic Kirgis Jr.,161  self-
determination observable from state practice includes the follow-
ing:
1. Freedom from colonial domination, as in certain areas in
Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.
162
2. The converse of above, the right to remain dependent, as
in the cases of the island of Mayotte in the Camoros, or Puerto
Rico.1
63
3. The right to peacefully dissolve a state and to form new
states on the territory of the former one, as in the former Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia.
Historical examples of pacific secessions are: the withdrawal
of Norway from the Norway/Sweden union in 1905; the withdrawal
of Senegal from the Mali federation in 1960; the withdrawal of
Singapore from the Malaysian federation in 1965; and the with-
drawal of Syria from the United Arab Republic in 1961.
According to the United Nations, "[t]here are at least five thousand indigenous groups
made up of three hundred million people that live in more than seventy countries on five
continents." Id. This apparently small number may be indicative of a U.N. policy to
minimize the number of peoples who can claim the rights of indigenous peoples.
161. See Kirgis, supra note 116, at 307.
162. There is a global consensus that the right of self-determination includes a right of
freedom from colonial domination. We have not come across any published dissenting
view on this. With his characteristic persuasive and emotive force Hector Gros-Espiell,
reported that:
A necessary consequence of recognition of the right of peoples under colonial
and alien domination to self-determination is the rejection and condemnation of
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. Under contemporary interna-
tional law, colomialism is an international crime expressly characterized as such,
for instance in para. 1 of General Assembly Resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12th Oc-
tober, 1970. The criminal character of colonialism and of acts by which it is
practiced calls for emphasis, because of its special significance and implications.
See GROS-ESPIELL, supra note 106, at 11 (emphasis added).
163. See Kirgis, supra note 116 at 307. The right to remain dependent is a necessary
counterpart of colonial self-determination, otherwise the latter becomes an imposition.
Nevertheless, the experiences of Morocco's "Green March" into Western Sahara, Ethio-
pia's "peasant march" into Eritrea, and the obvious territorial competition between the
United Kingdom and Argentina over the Falkland Islands, underscore the need for nor-
mative safeguards of the genuine will of the true colonized peoples.
842
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The Baltic states and Yugoslavia provide precedence for a
right to secede when there is a breakdown in the machinery of the
state. 164 The Soviet Union not only officially denounced the Baltic
states' (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) initial declaration of inde-
pendence, but also resisted it militarily. 165 The United States and
the European Community assisted the Baltic states' liberation
struggles against the consent and sovereignty of the Soviet Union
by imposing sanctions on the Soviet Union. 166 Similarly, the inter-
national community's intervention in the Yugoslavian civil war in
aid of Croatia is inconsistent with the preservation of the territo-
rial integrity of the country, and can only be explained in the con-
text of a post 1960 concept of self-determination. 167
4. A very selective right to secede.
The contemporary view is that there is no general right to
willful secession. 168 The -experience of Bangladesh, however, sug-
gests that a successful secession will be accepted. Additionally,
there is also a right to secede where it is based on egregious human
rights violations. 169 The case of the Iraqi Kurds presents an inter-
esting study of the international community's attitude toward bal-
ancing the necessity of intervention to facilitate secession in in-
stances of gross human rights violations that threaten the very
existence of a minority, with the dangers of setting a precedent for
eroding the territorial integrity of the sovereign state. 170
164. See Jane Stromseth, Self Determination, Secession and Humanitarian Intervention
by the U.N., ASIL PROC. 370 (1992).
165. See Trent Tappe, Chechnya and the State of Self-Determination in a Breakaway
Region of the former Soviet Union: Evaluating the Legitimacy of Secessionist Claims, 34
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 255, 262 (1995).
166. See Murswick, supra note 123, at 21.
167. See id.
168. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 96 at 57-59.
169. See Tomuschat, supra note 118, at 1. Thomas Franck believes that a minority
within a state occupying a discrete territory, may have a right to secede analogous to a
decolonization right, if it is persistently and egregiously denied political and social equal-
ity, as well as the opportunity to retain its cultural identity. See Thomas Franck, Post-
modern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 3, 13-14 (Catherine Br6lmann et al. eds., 1993).
170. The Anglo-French Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed on June 24, 1923, dis-
persed the Kurdish nation, predominantly of the Sunni stock in native religion and cul-
ture, among Turkey, Syria Iraq, and Iran. Kurdish nationalism dates back to the 1880s
under the leadership of Sheik Ubaydallah. Similar to the Ogonis, central to Iraq's re-
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5. The right of divided states to reunite, 171 as Germany has
demonstrated.
172
6. The right of limited autonomy, short of secession, for ter-
ritorial groups or ethnic, religious and linguistic groups.
7. The right of a minority group within a larger political en-
tity, pursuant to article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 173 and the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging
to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.
174
8. The right to a democratic form of government.
175
pression of the Kurdish liberation struggle is the oil revenues on Kurdish land. The his-
tory of the relationship between the Kurds and Iraq has been one of revolt, mass killings
and displacement. Specifically, in 1988, perceiving that the Kurds sided with the enemy
during the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq used poison gas against the Kurdish population, killing
over 5000 and forcefully relocating 100,000 to "strategic hamlets." In 1991, following de-
feat its in the Gulf War, and perceiving a Kurd uprising in the North, the Iraqi govern-
ment deliberately stirred a panic among the Kurds. Tormented by memories of the
chemical weapons attack in 1988, about two million Kurds fled in mass into inhabitable
border mountains. Turkey refused to accept the Kurdish refugees, even though it per-
ceived the Iraqi measure as a deliberate attempt to expel an unwanted minority in order
to appropriate their lands and oil resources. The Allied forces intervened in the northern
part of Iraq against the express wish of the Iraqi government. See generally Howard
Adelman, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the Kurds, 4 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 4
(1992). The Allied forces justified their intervention under Resolution 688 of the U.N.
Security Council, even though this resolution only authorized "humanitarian assistance."
The United Nations, however, did not withdraw the Allied powers' authority. The Allied
forces built camps, protected the enclave from external aggression, maintained an admini-
stration and a no-fly zone and ran an independent Kurdish state within Iraqi territory.
On May 18, 1991, the fleeing Kurds were able to negotiate autonomy with the unrepent-
ant Iraqi dictatorship. See Kurds Reach Agreement on Iraqi Democracy Plan Differences
on Autonomy Delay Signing, TORONTO STAR, May 19, 1991, at A2. The following two
observations regarding the Kurds' situation are germane to the development of self-
determination law:
1. The Allied powers' administration of the temporary Kurdistan state is an en-
dorsement of the Kurds' rights to independence.
2. The Kurds' negotiated autonomy can only be logically attributed to the U.N.
intervention. The Kurds were on the run and about to lose their ancestral
lands before the U.N. intervention. This endorses a normative minimum of
"autonomy" for an oppressed group such as the Kurds.
See id.
171. See Kirgis, supra note 116 at 307.
172. See Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, re-
printed in 29 I.L.M. 1186 (1990).
173. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 112, at art. 27.
174. Declaration on The Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities, supra note 129.
175. See Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
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Beyond the decolonization context, all the other rights or
claims are of varying juridical status. Based on both the Friendly
Relations Declaration 76 and the Vienna Declaration, 177 it is clear
that they are subject'to variables that act as their normative predic-
tors. These variables can be deciphered from the Declarations'
express disclaimer of any intent to authorize the dismemberment
of a state, and their overt protectiveness of governments represent-
ing all peoples within the territory. These variables are the degree
of representative government and the degree of destabilization.
They articulate state practice and attitudes to self-determination
claims beyond the colonial context as buttressed by the experience
of the Kurds of Iraq.
The consequences of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan state on
the Gulf Region has always compromised the international com-
munity's willingness to enforce their right to self-determination.
This supports a League of Nations Commission recommendation
that Kurdish territory remain part of Iraq. Prior to the Allied
forces 1991 intervention in Northern Iraq, Saddam Hussein's gov-
ernment could have been characterized as an absolute dictatorship
that was overtly taking steps to expel the Kurds. This extreme
negative end of the representative variable should have entitled
the Kurds to secession. The second variable, the destabilizing ef-
fect, however, was very potent given the presence of Kurds in
neighboring Iran, Syria and Turkey.178 The second variable, the
destabilizing effect, led to a compromise: autonomy. Autonomy,
informed and guided the compromise.
Singularly however, autonomy was not destabilizing, as the
Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdish nations in neighboring Iran, Syria and
Turkey have all had varying degrees of autonomy. Similarly, the
plight of the Basque in Spain and France, and Armeniance in Tur-
INT'L L. 46, 52 (1992).
176. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 114.
177. Vienna Declaration, supra note 127.
178. Thomas Friedman, After the War: Decision Not to Help Iraqi Rebels Puts U.S. in
an Awkward Position, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,1991, at Al. Friedman reported that President
George Bush was initially hesitant at the prospect of "Lebanonization" of Iraq or its
fragmentation. President Bush also did not want to: (1) fuel Kurdish separatism in the
entire Gulf region; (2) contribute to the dismemberment of Iraq; (3) set a dangerous
precedent for interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states; and (4) recommit
American ground forces on Iraqi territory. See Elaine Sciolino, After the War, How Bush
Overcame Reluctance and Embraced Kurdish Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at A6.
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key have largely been viewed by international community from
this lens. The Russian bombardment of Chechnya received little
condemnation because the international community believed that
Chechnya's secession would lead to further fragmentation 179 of the
presently unstable Russian federation.1
80
In the application of the above variables, states also take into
account the following considerations:
1. The group's historical claim.
181
2. The group's geographic location. 182
3. The group's economic viability. 183
4. The group's population. 184
5. The secessionist group's representativeness. 185
179. See Russia and the Mouse that Roars, U.S..NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 12, 1994;
see also Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Says Russian Move Is an Internal Affair, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1994, at A13.
180. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, distinct ethnic populations
emerged as isolated minorities within the new nations. See Philip Chase, Conflict in the
Crimea: An Examination of Ethnic Conflict Under the Contemporary Model of Sover-
eignty, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 219, 219-54 (1995). For example, there are now
roughly 25 million Russians living in "ethnic enclaves" outside of the Russian federation.
See id. at 220 n.1.
181. See Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation,
16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991); Kirgis, supra note 116 at 308 (observing that "[t]he de-
gree to which a claimed right to secede will be destabilising may depend on such things as
the plausibility of the historical claim of the secessionist group to the territory it seeks to
slice off.").
182. Within the Russian federation, the regions that have successfully negotiated
semi-autonomy lie within Russian territory, for example Bashkortostan and Tatarstan.
See Chase, supra note 180, at 237.
183. The Russian federation also presents the example here as "[tlhe regions that have
had success in their negotiations with Russia ... are characterized by economic prosper-
ity, which may have created a stronger incentive in Moscow for a peaceful resolution of
differences." Id.
184. Some commentators argue that small groups' choices are among the various
modes of implementation, even though their right to self-determination is not necessarily
nullified. See Otto Kimminich, A Federal Right of Self-Determination, in MODERN LAW
OF SELF-DETERMINATION 83, 96 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993). Although there is no
legal basis for denying the right of self determination based on small population or terri-
tory, these considerations are important because of the difficulties that could arise from
the resulting inability to form independent sovereign entities free from neo-colonialism
and capable of performing the traditional functions of a state in international law. See
GROS-ESPIELL, supra note 106, at 16.
185. See REIN MULLERSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW, RIGHTS AND POLITICS 86 (1994).
For a detailed analysis of the knotty problem of'a trapped minority within a secessionist
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6. The consent of the nation from which the region is seced-
ing.186
7. The degree of violence used to suppress the secession
movement and the consequent threat to regional international
peace.187
8. The extent to which the seceding group has exhausted all
other options. 188
9. The' group's historical claims of independence or auton-
omy.189
Minority rights that have been guaranteed by Convention ac-
quire a positive normative status that the aforementioned vari-
ables will not ordinarily abridge. It would be hasty to conclude,
however, that they are entirely removed from the purview of our
variables because it is what states do that generate international
law. The desirability of the foregoing is an entirely different mat-
ter.
Finally, the strategic interest of the powerful members of the
U.N. Security Council is a very important, albeit often ignored
consideration. The experience of the Saharawi Arab Democratic
Republic exemplifies a situation where the powerful states have
effectively negotiated away the judicially endorsed and popularly
acclaimed right of the Saharawians to independence from Mo-
rocco. 190 This author does not wish to be mistaken as endorsing
the selectivity of the U.N. Security Council as legitimate or even
lawful. This author's view is simply that it is a realistic considera-
tion that an intending secessionist group, or any group seeking
some other form of self-determination, cannot afford to ignore.
group, see Douglas Sanders, If Quebec Secedes from Canada Can the Cree Secede from
Quebec? 29 U.B.C.L. REV. 143 (1995).
186. See Lawrence Eastwood, Jr., Secession: State Practice and International Law Af-
ter the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 299,
321 (1993).
187. See LEFEBER & ZIEUS BROFMAN, PEOPLE AND MINORITIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 19-20 (1993); see also Lea Brilmayer, Groups, Histories and International
Law, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 537,555 (1992)
188. See Marc Weller, The International Response to the Desolution of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569,602 (1992).
189. See id.
190. See Yves Beighbeder, Western Sahara: Self-Determination or Annexation, in
INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERANDA AND NATIONAL
ELECTIONS 191 (1994).
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This speaks volumes for the effectiveness of self-determination as
an enforceable norm of international law.
3. The Ogoni Right to Self-Determination
Part II demonstrates that the Ogoni in Nigeria have been
subjected to egregious human rights violations. On this ground
alone the Ogoni have a legitimate claim to self-determination. 191
In addition, they are entitled to their individual minority rights. 192
Their rights as an ethnic group, however, deserve closer examina-
tion. The Nigerian government is at the extreme negative end of
our representative variable, and its "wasting operations" and re-
pressive violence, ouster-clauses and publicly acknowledged con-
tempt for the Ogoni people, even in diplomatic circles, underscore
the prospects of a negotiated settlement.193
If the Ogoni have a right to self-determination, what degree
can they validly claim? Can they secede from Nigeria? 194 Even
without applying our variables, secession does not seem feasible.
While their small population of 500,000 people and territory con-
sisting of only 1000 sq. km, may not constitute obstacles to seces-
sion, the Ogoni in Nigeria are an "inland" ethnic minority and as
191. See Franck, supra note 169. Dietrich Murswick captures the Ogoni situation in
his observation that:
Logically, the guarantee of the right of self-determination of peoples
implies the guarantee of the existence of every single people. If the
extermination of a people were allowed, the people's right to decide
upon its own political status or to dispose of its own natural resources
would be worthless.... All measures aimed at depriving the people of
its specific characteristics . . . for example, expulsion of parts of the
population [or creation of conditions compelling mass exodus], im-
prisonment or execution of the group's leaders-are incompatible with
the right of self-determination. A state that infringed this obligation
cannot pit the principle of sovereignty or of territorial integrity against
the people's right to secession.
Murswick, supra note 123, at 26-27.
192. See Franck, supra note 169.
193. It should be noted that the Ogoni Bill of Rights was presented to the military
government in 1991, two years before the Ogoni came before the U.N. in 1993. Most of
the Decrees that have violated Ogoni rights have removed judicial jurisdiction and can-
not, therefore, be judicially reviewed.
194. Biafrans, just like the Ogoni, also sought control of mineral resources in their re-
gion. Similar to Ogonis, they suffered egregious human rights violations in the ethnic
cleansing that took place in Northern Nigeria in 1966.
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yet there is no authoritative precedent of a secessionist state lying
entirely within the parent state. Lesotho and Gambia are clearly
anomalies.
On the other hand, the destabilizing variable underscores any
self-determination claim that seeks complicated changes to the
frontiers of the parent state. For example, although the Arbitra-
tion Commission of the Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia
(Badingter Commission)' 95 did not deny the right of Serbian
population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to self-
determination, it overruled their claim to a united Serbian state on
the ground that it would necessitate changes to existing frontiers
between Croatia and Bosnia.196 Thus, where the minority group is
located in the heart of the parent state, secession is not a practical
option.
What about autonomy? Against the background of a minor-
ity group's precarious existence, autonomy seems short-ranged but
consolatory. An application of our destabilizing variable, how-
ever, reveals underlying problems even with autonomy. The Bia-
fran Ahiara Declaration of Independence which was similar to the
Ogoni Bill of Rights, declared the Biafran war a struggle against
ethnic domination. While the Biafran in the eastern area of Nige-
ria waged their war of secession, Western Nigeria also threatened
to secede if the government allowed the Biafrans to leave. After
losing the war, the Biafrans were compelled to return to Nigeria 197
where ethnic domination has continued unabated among the Ibos
who formally made up Biafra. 198 Western Nigeria has re-echoed
the secession threat in the wake of the military annulment of the
June 1993 presidential election, clearly won by Chief M.K.O.
195. See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 2, Jan. 11,
1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1497 (1992).
196. See id.
197. Major-General Phillip Effiong declared Biafra's surrender to Nigeria. See N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1970, at 13.
198. This is perhaps the basis upon which Dr. Alex Ekwueme, a respected tbo elder-
statesman, muted the idea of a rotational presidency between six regions in Nigeria and a
multiple vice-presidency in the National Constitutional Conference of 1995. The north-
ern section of the country resisted the idea, and a compromise of a transitional rotation
between North and South was accepted. A North-South rotation, however, would not
guarantee protection of a minority ethnic interest. It should be recalled that the Ogoni
fought against the Biafra secession out of a fear of becoming a trapped minority. See id.
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Abiola, a Westerner. Chief Abiola has since been detained by the
government without trial for declaring himself president.
At the root of the Ogoni struggle is ownership of the oil be-
neath their ancestral lands. Ogoniland's potential production ca-
pacity, however, does not exceed 28,000 barrels per day, which is
less than 1.5% of Nigeria's total oil production of approximately 2
million barrels per day.199 Other minority ethnic communities in
the Niger Delta area who have also lost their lands and resources
to the government, produce most of the remaining ninety-eight
percent. In considering the foregoing, the history of the Biafran
civil war, the denial of the presidency to the western part of Nige-
ria, ethnic fragmentation in Nigeria, providence, and clear logic
dictates that one should anticipate that autonomy for the Ogoni
will generate multitudes of autonomy liberation struggles as well
as malignant feelings of discrimination.2 00 With a population of
more than 100 million, which is sufficient to dominate the West
Africa sub-region, and a strategic economy that serves as a lifeline
to the sub-region, the destabilizing consequences of an internal
crisis in Nigeria is better imagined than realized.
Does the foregoing deny the Ogoni a right to autonomy? It is
perfectly logical to argue that the Ogoni not only have a right to
autonomy per customary international law, but also a natural right
based on self-defense. How willing is the international community
to stir up the embedded ethnic passion of Nigeria? On the other
hand, it is the willingness and activity of the international com-
munity that generates international law. This dilemma is not pe-
culiar to the Ogoni question, it is also an African problem.
4. Africa's Post-Colonial Burden
Professor Richard Falk first admitted that traditional interna-
tional law was designed to serve the interests of the European na-
199. See Collins, supra note 11.
200. This would vindicate Maivan Clech Lan's criticism that discrimination is a general
defect in the special protection given to indigenous peoples. Such special treatments por-
tray that "to paraphrase Orwell, some families of subjugation (blue water) are more equal
than others." Maivbn Clech LAm, Making Room for Peoples at the United Nations:
Thoughts Provoked by Indigenous Claims to Self-Determination, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
603, 616 (1992).
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tions that developed it.201 This perhaps accounts for why interna-
tional law indicted colonialism as criminal202 and yet protected
colonial acquisitions, which by logical extension are riddled with
criminality, under such principles as "prompt and adequate com-
pensation" and "acquired rights. '203
Contemporary international law has hardly shed its traditional
garb. This is evident in the contemporary concept of self-
determination, which has been lukewarm in recognizing group
rights of ethnic nations. 204 One can trace this to the modern west-
ern notions of individualism that sacralizes the individual over his
community.205 On the contrary, in Africa, the ethnic nation re-
mains the most cohesive and harmonious political entity. 206 Based
on its biological and historical evolution as a transgenerational
group,20 7 the pre-colonial African ethnic nation has been the inde-
201. See Richard Falk, Historical Tendencies, Modernizing and Revolutionary Nations,
and the International Legal Order, 8 HOw. L.J. 128, 133-35 (1962).
202. See GROS-ESPIELL, supra note 106.
203. For discussions of tension between sovereignty over resources, colonial acquisi-
tions and international law principles, see Brownlie, supra note 106, at 521-52; see also
Seminar Discussions on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States reprinted in
ASIL PROC. 223 (1975); Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources in KANAL
HASSAIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 33 (1980);
Bertain Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 NO. ILL. U.L.
REV. 347,406 (1993).
204. See Sergesvery, supra note 103; see also Emerson, The Fate of Human Rights in
The Third World, WORLD POLITICS 201, 207 (1975) (espousing the view that interna-
tional self determination law does not provide for situations where major ethnic cleavages
divide the people of a state).
205. See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
156 (1989). According to Professor Donnelly, "most human rights refer principally to the
individual considered separate from the community, and they are valued primarily as
claims against the communities." Id. An apparently vexed statement of the same argu-
ment says:
[A]bstract concepts have in the past only too often presented grave dangers to
the enjoyment by individuals of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Some of the worst violations of those rights have been perpetrated in the service
of some inspiring abstractions, such as ... the nation ... and indeed the masses.
A "people" is no less an abstraction than any of these: it cannot in reality con-
sist of anything more than the individuals who compose it.
PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 368 (1983) (emphasis
added).
206. See Mutua, supra note 142, at 505. Observing states in Africa, Dr. Mutua noted
that "citizenship means little, and carried few substantial rights or duties compared with
membership in a family, clan, religious sect or ethnic community." Id.
207. See also, Segesvary, supra note 103. He made the following conclusions, which
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structible and effective political community of the malfunctioning
post-colonial state.20 8 While the modern sovereign state is a mere
juridical fiction,20 9 what transforms this juridical fiction into an
empirical reality is a national consciousness. 210 Experiences of
malfunction of the state show that a harmonious multinational
state in Africa must be based on the willful evolution of these
"bio-political organisms" (the ethno-cultural political commu-
nity). The post-colonial state did not precede the ethnic-nation
and cannot assimilate it by compulsion. Therefore, the disman-
tling of sovereign and independent kingdoms and empires in Af-
rica and their coercive amalgamation into the modern state, with-
are valid for the African ethnic group:
a. That the individual and his group are ontologically interdependent, i.e., the
life and destiny of the individual and group are inextricably intertwined. There
can be no individual without a group; there can be no group without individuals
who are not only actors in social and cultural life, but the bearer of the group's
belief and value systems of its traditionally transmitted symbolic order.
b. Group identities include physical elements of the body (which is of biological
origin) and the natural environment, and the psychological element, i.e., the dis-
tinction between "we" and "they."
Id. In summary, while the evolution of the individual and his ethnic group are inextrica-
bly linked, the psychological element demarcates the ethnic group as a political commu-
nity.
208. Its indestructibility is well borne out by this song:
We carry in our hearts the true country,
And that cannot be stolen,
We carry in our hearts the true country,
And that cannot be broken
Quoted in Adelman, supra note 170, at 15; see also CZESLAW MILOSZ, SWING SHIFT IN
THE BALTICS, THE NEW TONE REVIEW OF BOOKS 15 (explaining the recent upsurge in
national feelings argued that technological revolution has negatively created a modern
void, and the innate human need to belong redirects to the group in a search for personal-
ity).
209. See Robert Jackson, Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa, 46 J. INT'L AFF. 1
(1992). Professor Jackson draws a distinction between juridical statehood and empirical
statehood. While the United Nations principle of sanctity of states corresponded with the
former, it did not guarantee the latter. Professor Jackson argues that juridical statehood
conferred an international legitimacy on the the post colonial African state which covered
up its internal illegitimacy especially during the Cold War. In other words decolonization
vested international legitmacy on colonial entities without regard to their internal legit-
macy. Thus while juridical statehood refers to political independence, it did not guaran-
tee the internal harmony of the system. See id.
210. See Adelman, supra note 170, at 16. It is the common national destiny that cre-
ates the will in a people to assume the future of a state, whereas the westphalian state
prioritizes its physical boundaries. See id.
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out deference to cultural, linguistics, demographic, and social fac-
tors arrested the evolutionary process, while the principle of state
sanctity imprisoned the continent.
There are grounds for arguing that the Westphalian state and
its state nationalism were a historical metamorphosis of traditional
European type of indigenous nationalism. It has been observed
that in traditional Europe, indigenous nationalism prevailed as the
norm by consolidating cultural predominance over a specific terri-
tory governed by a single state. The "nation preceded the state
and was its foundation rather than the state becoming the instru-
ment to forge a new nation. ''2 11
This is perhaps why the very first articulation of self-
determination as a concept by President Wilson was a synthesis of
two factors: (1) consent of the group and (2) their cultural iden-
tity.212  This original version is known as national self-
determination and is what Obiora Okwu-Okafor has aptly called
"The Pure Theory of Self-Determination. '213 The practical con-
sequence of absence of consent in the amalgamation of the post-
colonial African state has been the legitimization of coercive as-
similation of nations, tyranny, and violent repression of liberation
movements.214 The specter of failed states has been attributed to
the tyranny and authoritarianism of the contrived states in Africa
and their concocted citizenry. 215 This is the heritage of colonialism
and Africa's post-colonial burden which will remain a recurring
decimal to the international law of self-determination.
211. Id.
212. See ALFRED COBBAN, THE NATION-STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-
DETERMINATION 109-10.
213. Okwu-Okafor, supra note 6, at 95.
214. See YILMA MAKONNEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW STATES OF
AFRICA: A STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF STATE SUCCESSION
IN THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES OF EASTERN AFRICA 462 (1983) (observing that
"the whole task of national integration and nation building may require the denial of the
right to ethnic self determination in most territories as they emerge from dependency.").
215. See Mutua, supra note 142, at 505. The 1885 Berlin conference which laid the
foundation for the modern day Africa was based on interests totally alien to the African.
Crawford Young, The Heritage of Colonialism, in AFRICA WORLD POLITICS 10 (John
Harbeson & Donald Rothchild eds., 1991).
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. IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN BE DONE?
The current crisis in Ogoni cannot be said to have taken the
world by surprise. In 1994, Okwu-Okafor Obiora astutely antici-
pated the situation.2 16 After the genocide in Rwanda, Angola,
Kwa-Zulu, Somalia, Southern Sudan, Liberia, and Uganda, is it
not crystal clear that the African contrived state is very sick? Will
it take a genocidal Burundi to confirm the prognosis? Eminent
predictions indicative of the causes are not necessarily in short
supply. 217 Professor Mazrui Ali suggested an African Security
Council composed of South Africa, Ethiopia, Zaire (now Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo), Nigeria, and Egypt.218 None of the
above, however, is stable by itself. Nigeria, Zaire and Ethiopia are
neck-deep in crisis, while Egypt battles Islamic fundamentalism.
South Africa after Nelson Mandela, is still anybody's guess. The
Zulus have not been silent. In addressing a solution, it is necessary
to first debunk the stigmatization of any intellectual discourse of
the ethnic factor as "ethnocentrism" or "post-modern tribal-
ism." 2 19 It betrays a superficial appreciation of the reality of a
complex situation that can be properly described as a conundrum
of "nations without a state versus states without a nation. ' 220 At
the center of it all is the ethnic-nation. It would be hypocritical to
216. Okwu-Okafor in reference to the Ogoni struggle had forewarned that the Ogoni
profound feeling of alienation was a festering sore in need of immediate attention. See
Okwu-Okafor, supra note 6, at 115.
217. The Hutu-Tutsi conflict is the same old story of ethnic domination with colonial
roots in Africa. See Mutua, supra note 142, at 521. In 1993, a distinguished historian, Al-
Mazrui had predicted that:
[O]ver the next century the outlines of most of present day African States will
change in one of two main ways. One will be ethnic self deteimination, which will
create smaller States, comparable to the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia. The
other will be regional integration towards large political communities and economic
unions.
The Bondage of the Boundaries, Why Africa's Maps will be Redrawn, ECONOMIST, Sept.
11, 1993, at 28. Boutros Boutros-Ghali is reported to have conceded that "ethnic conflict
poses as great a danger to common world security as did the Cold War." Julia Preston,
Ethnic Conflict Imperils Security, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1993, at A13.
218. See Mazrui Ali, The Message of Rwanda: Recolonize Africa?, NEW PERSPECTIVE
QUARTERLY, Sept. 22, 1994, at 18.
219. See Franck, supra note 175, at 3.
220. See NANA KUSI APPEA BUSSIA, JR., THE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRE-
COLONIAL AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY PRACTICES 245 (1994).
[Vol. 19:811
Self-Determination and the Ogoni Question
ignore this truth. On the other hand, we must come to grips with
historical complexities that have translated into unavoidable reali-
ties, including: (1) the post-colonial economy's natural resource
fixation; and (2) colonial bounaries.
First, because of the colonial economies' emphasis on raw ma-
terials and cash crops, post-colonial African states are still largely
dependent on agriculture and mineral resources for survival.
Thus, until individual self enterprises support the economies,
communities with natural endowments would probably be re-
quired to provide for the entire colonial states. On the other hand,
as long as these communities cannot share in what rightfully be-
longs to them, internal peace may remain elusive.
Second, redefining colonial boundaries also may not be prac-
ticable. Historical claims do not always provide precise and de-
terministic evidentiary tools and are likely to leave lingering feel-
ings of injustice and deprivations. Also, memories of Morocco's
Green March into Western Sahara and Ethiopia's peasant march
into Eritrea dictate that bringing up the question of boundary re-
demarcation may endorse a post-colonial scramble for Africa by
Africans. This should serve as warning that India's redemarcation
of its colonial boundaries may not be an apt precedent for Africa,
as the India Pakistani enmity is traceable to that redemarcation.
Furthermore, the Nigerian-Cameroon conflict over the Bakassi-
Peninsula, 221 which resulted in intense fighting at the border, gives
insight into what intrastate territorial claims in post-colonial Af-
rica would look like.
Beyond both states' initial resort to military force, there were
several complexities that undermine the desirability of redemar-
cating Africa's borders. For example, while Cameroon claims the
peninsula, a majority of the inhabitants are Nigerians. Addition-
ally, France's premature intervention on behalf of Cameroon un-
derscores the fact that factors besides historical claims, for exam-
ple-external interests-will play a substantial role in any
redemarcation of Africa. The Uti-Possidetis Principle may well
have become a necessary evil. In seeking a solution that is not
only just, but realistic, this writer contends that a non-
221. The Bakassi-Peninsula is a collection of Islands in the Gulf of Guinea of ap-
proximately twenty square miles bordering Nigeria and Cameroon, which is very rich in
oil resources.
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revolutionary solution, such as in the international law of self-
determination, is the most viable tool for relieving Africa of its
colonial burden. Looking at our variables and factual lenses, such
as "egregious human rights violations," it is clear that the contem-
porary law of self-determination is inadequate to accommodate
the African problem. Its principles can only be reactive in the Af-
rican context where ethnic conflicts are imminent. This is because
colonial Africa was built on ethnic division and post-colonial Af-
rica preserved the inequities of colonial Africa. Therefore, the law
of self-determination tends to focus on the symptoms and conse-
quences of internal crisis instead of its causes. Furthermore, given
that the enforcement of the self-determination of minorities often
requires multilateral cooperation it acquires a political content in
which the dominant and oppressive group may hold sway and
small nations such as the Ogoni may end up not having any pro-
tection.
This paper proposes a pro-active foundational solution: ex-
pansion of the law of self-determination to mandate in Africa a
loose federation based on ethno-cultural autonomy, with defense
and foreign relations being a preserve of the state. This middle of
the road solution has several benefits. It retains the original con-
sent theory of nationalism with its cultural basis without tampering
with the uti-possidetis boundaries. In addition, it recognizes pre-
colonial property rights and allows for a negotiated relationship
between the real owners and the state. It will therefore, not en-
gender separatist or secessionist movements. On the contrary, it
will foster emergence of a virile harmonious state where a con-
scious desire to build a home will galvanize participation. Does
the Draft Declaration on indigenous peoples foreshadow the
emergence of such a right?
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